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The increasing importance of offshoring (defined conventionally as the geograph-
ical separation of production activities across two or more countries, as in the classic
paper by Feenstra and Hanson 1999), matched with an improved accessibility of
data, has boosted the empirical literature on its effects on domestic labour markets.1
The main emphases have been placed on the effects of offshoring on the
employment/labour demand structure and wages (including the evolution of the
skilled-unskilled wage gap).2 So far, the main focus has been put on developed
countries, as they are the countries whose labour markets are at risk of ‘‘losing’’ as a
consequence of transferring parts of production (or tasks) abroad to less developed
destinations. Unsurprisingly, much of the attention has been given to outcomes
visible in the US labour market, considering primarily the effects of offshoring to
such developing countries as Mexico (e.g., Sethupathy 2013), China or India (e.g.
Liu and Trefler 2008), or to the results of occupational exposure to globalization due
to rising import competition from China and other developing countries (e.g. Autor
et al. 2013; Ebenstein et al. 2014; Acemoglu et al. 2014). Similar analyses have
been performed to assess the offshoring response of labour markets in single
advanced Western European countries (e.g. UK: Amiti and Wei 2005; Austria:
Egger and Egger 2003; Belgium: Michel and Rycx 2012; Denmark: Hummels et al.
2014; Germany: Geishecker and Go¨rg 2008; Baumgarten et al. 2013).
Many factors can affect wages.3 In this paper, we focus on the industry-level
response of wages paid in domestic industries (in which imported inputs are
employed) to offshoring, in particular to low-wage countries (LWC).4 However, as
will be explained, we adopt a much wider perspective than that taken so far. Before
describing our contribution, we will shed some light on the existing related
evidence. Given the scope of our paper, we leave aside country-specific analyses
1 A comprehensive review of the offshoring effects on labour markets is provided by Feenstra (2010).
2 An important parallel stream of research underlined the impact of technological progress on wages
(especially of low-skilled workers, e.g. through computerization). In particular, skill biased technological
change (SBTC), identified as the tendency of new technology to complement skilled-workers and to
substitute unskilled labour, can result in labour demand shifts and increase in wage inequalities (among
others: Card and Di Nardo 2002). Technical change can be linked to offshoring activity: Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2014) demonstrate in their ‘integrating framework’ that trade in tasks is similar to
technical change while Acemoglu et al. (2015) introduce directed technical change into a Ricardian
model of offshoring and show that offshoring and technical change are substitutes in the short run but
complements in the long run.
3 Several streams of labour economics literature are related to wage determination process, covering such
aspects as: the interplay between skill demand and supply (Card and Lemieux 2001; Acemoglu and Autor
2011), wage effects of the assignment of skills to tasks (Autor 2013); job and wage polarisation (Goos
et al. 2014); relations between worker and employer in the presence of imperfect competition on labour
markets (Manning 2011), decentralisation of wage bargaining (Dahl et al. 2013); collective bargaining
and the role of labour unions (Cahuc et al. 2014, 401–478); the evolution of participation rates, part-time
work and other factors affecting labour supply (Cahuc et al. 2014, 3–76).
4 Throughout the paper we use the term ‘offshoring’ to capture the allocation of business activities to
another country, assuming that it involves flows of intermediates (inputs) across borders, visible in
international input–output tables (Feenstra 1998). Offshoring to low-wage countries (LWC) refers to
inputs imported from LWC.
Empirica
123
based on worker-level or firm-level micro-data—as surveyed in Crino` (2009) or
Castellani et al. (2015). Focusing on industry-level studies, most papers address the
impact of the international sourcing of inputs on industry-level outcomes in terms of
reduced employment/overall labour demand (e.g. Amiti and Wei 2005 for the UK;
Acemoglu et al. 2014 for the US; Cadarso et al. 2008 for Spain; Falk and Wolfmayr
2005, 2008 for a small sample of EU countries; Hijzen and Swaim 2007 for 17
OECD countries; Michel and Rycx 2012 for Belgium). Overall, most of these
studies tend to fail to support the view that substantial statistically significant job
losses can be observed at the industry level directly due to offshoring. Import
competition in industries exposed to foreign competition can have a stronger
impact, as illustrated in a study by Acemoglu et al. (2014)—their estimates suggest
net job losses in the US of 2.0–2.4 million stemming from the rise in import
competition from China over the period 1999–2011.
Additionally, the impact of offshoring on changes in the skill composition of
labour demand has been analysed, pointing towards a negative influence on the
demand for less skilled workers. Regarding wider panel data studies, Foster-
McGregor et al. (2013) employ WIOD data (40 countries, 1995–2009) and find that
medium-skilled workers suffer the most in terms of shrinking labour demand as a
response to offshoring (similar effects are documented in Timmer et al. 2013).
Offshoring of services also appears to raise the relative demand for high- and
medium-skilled workers (see Crino` 2012, covering 20 industries and nine Western
EU countries over 1990–2004).
Is the source of imports important when assessing the labour market effects of
offshoring? Egger and Egger (2003) introduced a crucial distinction between
offshoring to low-wage and high-wage countries, while Bernard et al. (2006)
distinguished between imports from high-income versus low-income countries.
Since then, a division of offshoring by the source country has been employed in
other studies too, including ones performed at the industry level. Despite
conventional worries, Falk and Wolfmayr (2005) estimate that rising intermediate
imports from low-wage countries may account for a relatively small reduction in
manufacturing employment of only 0.25 percentage points per year in their sample
of seven EU countries (1995–2000), while a study by Falk and Wolfmayr (2008)
finds no significant effect of services purchased from low-wage countries on
manufacturing employment.
There is not so much broad evidence on the effects of offshoring on wages. The
recent micro-level papers investigating the impact of international outsourcing on
the wages of individual workers are country-specific and limited to countries with
good access to micro-data (such as the US: Ebenstein et al. 2014; Autor et al. 2014;
Germany: Geishecker and Go¨rg 2008; Denmark: Hummels et al. 2014; UK:
Geishecker and Go¨rg 2013) or limited to very small samples of countries. Again,
contrary to common fears, the estimated wage cuts due to outsourcing appear to be
rather small in economic terms.5 For instance, Geishecker et al. (2010) use data for
Germany, the UK and Denmark (1991–1999) and find a small negative and weakly
5 This is also confirmed by more general studies about the relationship between trade and wages (e.g.
Polga´r and Wo¨rz 2010).
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statistically significant effect of offshoring on wages in Germany, a positive effect
in the UK and no statistically significant effect in Denmark. When they consider
different skill categories of workers, a negative effect found only for Germany
accrues to low-skilled workers (but it is small6) while for low-skilled UK and
Danish workers they cannot identify any outsourcing effect. For the UK, a sizable
negative and statistically significant wage effect stems only from outsourcing to
CEEC but it vanishes when put in the perspective of real data.7 In their industry-
level study performed for a wide sample of EU27 countries, Parteka and
Wolszczak-Derlacz (2015) also conclude that offshoring reduces the wage growth
of domestic medium- and low-skilled workers. However, they show that this
negative effect is economically small.
Building upon the existing literature briefly summarized above, our aim is to
provide worldwide evidence on the offshoring-wage nexus using industry-level data
and hopefully complementing the existing studies performed at other levels of detail
but limited along the country dimension. We aim to fill some important gaps in the
related empirical literature.
First, we consider a long panel of industrial data (13 manufacturing industries in
40 countries over the period 1995–20098) derived from the World Input–Output
Database (WIOD—Timmer et al. 2015) which covers between 82 and 96 % of the
international trade in intermediate goods (depending on the sector and year of
analysis). We thus provide representative evidence on the global trends in
offshoring and, in contrast to the many country-level studies, exploit its wage
effects in a multi-country setting.
Moreover, given the crucial heterogeneity of workers in international trade
analysis (Grossman 2013), we consider the wages of three skill groups separately
(low, medium and highly skilled), focusing on the effects on the workers who are
potentially most at danger—the low and medium skilled ones. Even though WIOD
has already been used (in a more restricted manner) in some related studies (e.g.
Foster-McGregor et al. 2013; Schwo¨rer 2013; Parteka and Wolszczak-Derlacz
2015), to the best of our knowledge this is the first time that the response of skill-
specific wages to offshoring has been analysed in a worldwide cross-country
perspective over a significant time period.
In addition, while we correlate the wage levels of workers with offshoring
intensity, we decompose the latter by country of origin.9 This is done in order to
6 They estimate that on average in Germany a one percentage point increase in outsourcing intensity
lowers wages for low-skilled workers by a little more than one percent. The overall effect is small, as over
the period analysed average outsourcing increased by 1.6 percent. Hence, outsourcing cumulatively
reduced wages in Germany by about 2.5 percent. This result is in line with the estimates by Geishecker
and Go¨rg (2008), also for Germany.
7 UK outsourcing to CEEC increased by 0.07 percentage points, which implies a very modest cumulative
wage reduction of 2.7 percent over the period analysed (Geishecker et al. 2010, 196).
8 WIOD (release November 2013) provides data for the period 1995–2011, but the statistics needed for
the computation of the wages of different skill groups of workers is only available up to 2009.
9 Following the nomenclature used in input–output analysis, ‘source country’ or ‘country of origin’ is the
country from which inputs are imported (hence, the country to which the offshoring takes place), while
‘destination country’ is the country where the imported inputs are used.
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explicitly check for the effects of offshoring to developing10 and low-wage
countries (LWC) on domestic wages. In particular, we use four alternative LWC
classifications.11 Importantly, we go beyond standard very rough groupings of LWC
based on comparisons of income per capita or an arbitrary attribution of countries to
the low-wage category. Due to the use of industry-level wage data, we obtain
flexible classification of LWC over time and by industry. Moreover, drawing on
bilateral input–output tables, we directly split imported inputs according to the
country of origin of the imports (rather than using a proportional method based on
shares of total imports, which is employed instead of using tables of imports by
country of origin, as in Falk and Wolfmayr 2008; Hertveldt and Michel 2013). We
also allow for changes in the relative positions of LWC over time, and the existence
of industry-specific wage advantages.
Finally, we adopt a decomposition of conventional overall offshoring measures
(calculated—in the spirit of Feenstra and Hanson 1999—as the sum of imported
inputs related to the total value of production of the industry in which they are used)
into purely international and domestic components. As Castellani et al. (2013)
argue, typical measures of offshoring tend to overestimate the role of international
components (imported inputs) and neglect the role played by structural changes and
flows of intermediates within the domestic economy. Consequently, the adopted
decomposition allows us to distinguish between the wage effects of the international
component of outsourcing and the effects of domestic outsourcing practices.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2, we present the data used
in our empirical analysis, and in Sect. 3 we present some crucial facts concerning
the trends in offshoring and wages in the period analysed. Section 4 focuses on the
estimated empirical model. Results are presented in Sect. 5 starting from the most
general setting and then taking into account specificities of source countries and
destination countries. Endogeneity in the wage-offshoring relationship is addressed
through the use of a gravity-based instrument. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes.
In a nutshell, the main results of our analysis are the following. We document
that in the period analysed the intensity of manufacturing offshoring to LWC rose
(on average) from 0.025 to 0.075 of the industry value added. However, we find that
increasing offshoring (in particular to LWC) is related to a decrease in the industry-
level wages of domestic low- and medium-skill workers, but this effect, albeit
statistically significant, is relatively small. We estimate that, ceteris paribus, a rise
in offshoring to LWC of 1 % can be associated with a decline in domestic low
(medium) skill workers’ wages of approximately 0.08 % (0.07 %).12
10 Throughout the paper, developing countries are defined as low- and middle-income countries,
according to the classification by the World Bank, 2014 (see Table 10 in the ‘‘Appendix’’).
11 Two more are used in the robustness check section (see footnote 21). The classifications are obtainable
in a separate file as additional online material accompanying the paper.
12 LWC classification 4—see Table 1. Intensity of offshoring measured according to Eq. 1. The values
on offshoring refer to weighted averages across 13 manufacturing industries in 40 destination countries,
with weights corresponding to industry size (employment)—see Fig. 2. Elasticities based on estimation
results reported in Tables 5 and 6.
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2 Data and measurement of offshoring
Our data come from the World Input–Output Database (WIOD—described in
Timmer et al. 2015), consisting of the World Input–Output Tables, WIOT
(release: November 2013) and the WIOD Socio Economic Accounts, SEA
(update: July 2014). The database reports industry-specific data on socio-economic
accounts (value added, gross output etc.) and international input–output
tables across 35 industries and 40 countries (plus the rest of the world). After
careful inspection of the data, we chose to deal with a broad country sample but
restrict our analysis to the 13 manufacturing industries reporting more reliable
statistics and excluding raw materials13 (see Tables 9 and 10 in the ‘‘Appendix’’
for a list of the industries and countries). In particular, using information on
labour compensation and hours worked over the period 1995–2009 (see footnote
8), we compute the real hourly wages expressed in 2005 USD14 of three distinct
skill groups of workers (h—high-, m—medium- and l—low-skilled; the classi-
fication is based on educational attainment) for each country, industry and time
period.
Input–output data serve to compute offshoring measures. In the first instance,
using information on imported intermediates from WIOD, we calculate conven-
tional industry-specific offshoring indices (Feenstra and Hanson 1999), defined as
the ratio of imported intermediate inputs to the value added in the industry in which
they are employed.15 In all the specifications, we take into account a broad measure
of offshoring,16 OFF (also called inter-industry offshoring), which is given by the
ratio of intermediate purchases (m) imported by industry j in destination country i at
13 In particular, we exclude from the set of manufacturing industries the sector ‘‘Coke, refined petroleum
and nuclear fuel’’, imports of which might not represent offshoring practice but rather a purchase of inputs
in the form of natural resources not available domestically. The same approach is adopted, for instance,
by Hummels et al. (2014).
14 The original dataset reports labour compensation in current local currencies, so following the OECD
method we compute real wages (deflated by a household consumption deflator, 2005 = 100, from Penn
World Table 8.0), and express them in USD (using 2005 exchange rates from WIOD, Sept 2012 update).
An alternative way of obtaining wages comparable across time and countries involves either using current
exchange rates or PPPs. Our findings are not sensitive to such changes as the three series of wages are
highly correlated (for instance, for low skilled wages the coefficient of correlation between our series of
wages and the aforementioned two alternatives equals 0.95 and 0.96, respectively).
15 We are aware that the measure based on the data on imported intermediate inputs obtained from input–
output tables should be treated as a proxy of offshoring practice. For example, caveats on indirect
offshoring measures are discussed in (Michel and Rycx 2012). We discuss the potential limits of our
offshoring indices and how to address them in the robustness section.
16 Alternatively, as put forward by Feenstra and Hanson (1999), a narrow (intra-industry) measure of
offshoring could be employed. This measures the share of imported intermediate inputs from the same
industry in terms of its value added. Formally, narrow offshoring for industry j is computed as (Hijzen
and Swaim 2007): OFFNj ¼ Ik¼j=VAj. However, given caveats of such a measure we considered another
formulation of offshoring used in the literature (Hijzen and Swaim 2007; Parteka and Wolszczak-Derlacz
2015), and sometimes called ‘differential’ outsourcing (Hijzen et al. 2005), covers inputs from all
industries k other than j OFFBj ¼
PK
k¼1 Ik 6¼j=VAj. The correlation between our preferred measure of
offshoring intensity (as in Eq. 1) and differential outsourcing equals 0.72.
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This broad measure allows us to capture the inter-industry effects of offshoring
on the performance of industries incorporating cross-industry spillovers, which need
not be the same as intra-industry effects.17
Furthermore, following Castellani et al. (2013), we decompose the offshoring




















where d is the value of the inputs coming from domestic industries employed in
industry j. The first expression is the ratio of imported inputs to domestic ones
(IntOUT—international outsourcing) while the second reflects the intensity of
domestic outsourcing (DomOUT).18 As Castellani et al. (2013) argue, offshoring
indices calculated as the share of imported inputs over production (Eq. 1) ignore the
role played by structural changes in the domestic economy, reflected in the Dom-
OUT component, and tend to overestimate the role played by sourcing to foreign
destinations.
Our database comprises many different countries, so we adopt a gradual analysis,
taking into account the heterogeneity of both the source countries (to which
offshoring takes place) and the destination countries (where we examine the wage
effects of offshoring). In the first instance, we consider flows of intermediates
imported from all 40 countries (so we consider all the countries of origin) and then
disentangle the effects of offshoring. To do this, the measures defined in Eqs. 1 and
2 are recalculated taking into account the source of imports. In particular, we go
beyond the standard consideration of imports from developing countries and
explicitly assess the wage effects of offshoring to low-wage countries (LWC),
denoted by OFF_LWC or IntOUT_LWC and only take into account inputs imported
from LWC.
In the absence of wage data which are comparable across many countries, most
previous papers have used a rather indirect way of defining low-wage countries
(LWC), assuming that countries with a low income per person also have low wages.
The common definition of LWC relies on a comparison of GDP per capita to a
benchmark country (e.g. the US) setting some arbitrary threshold. For instance,
Federico (2014) defines LWC as countries whose GDP per capita was less than
10 % of US GDP per capita in the final year of his sample; while Bernard et al.
17 This view is supported by the findings of Hijzen and Swaim (2007) and Baumgarten et al. (2013), who
report modest wage effects of within-industry offshoring and substantial wage effects of offshoring if
cross-industry spillovers are allowed for.
18 Castellani et al. (2013) call these components: the imported inputs ratio and structural change.
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(2006) and Khandelwal (2010) adopt a threshold of 5 % of US GDP per capita. We
overcome this limit by using the WIOD socio-economic accounts data, which allow
us to compare wages across a wide sample of countries. Hence, an important
novelty of our approach lies in the fact that we quantify offshoring to LWC on the
basis of a precise identification constructed with wage data at the industry level.
We employ four alternative definitions of low-wage countries (LWC), which are
summarized in Table 1. A file containing full set of LWC classifications can be
downloaded from the journal’s webpage as additional online material accompany-
ing the paper. The first definition is similar to that adopted by Federico (2014), but
we take into account changes in relative income per capita19 taking place over time
(note that in 1995—the first year of our analysis—eight countries were below the
threshold, while in 2009—the last year of analysis—only three were, so keeping this
Table 1 Low-wage countries (LWC)—alternative classifications adopted. Source: own elaboration
based on wage data from WIOD and GDP and population statistics from PWT 8.0









Yes No 1995: BGR, CHN,
IDN,IND,LTU,LVA,ROU,RUS
2009: CHN, IND, IDN
(2) wit\10 % of
wt
US
Yes No 1995: BGR, BRA,CHN,
IDN,IND,LTU,ROU,RUS
2009: BGR, BRA, CHN, IDN, IND,MEX
(3) wijt\10 % of
wjt
US
Yes Yes 1995: Industry 15t16: CHN, IDN, IND, RUS
Industry 17t18: BGR, BRA, CHN, IDN, IND,
ROU RUS
2009: Industry 15t16: BGR, CHN, IND







Yes Yes 1995: Industry 15t16: BGR, BRA, CHN, CZE,
EST, IDN, IND, LTU, LVA, MEX, ROU,
RUS, SVK, TUR;
Industry 17t18: BGR, BRA, CHN, CZE, EST,
HUN, IDN, IND, LTU, LVA, MEX, POL,
ROU, RUS, SVK, TUR; etc.
2009: Industry 15t16: BGR, BRA, CHN, HUN,
IDN, IND, LVA, MEX, RUS, SVK, TUR
Industry 17t18: BGR, BRA, CHN, HUN, IDN,
IND, LTU, LVA, MEX, POL, ROU, RUS,
SVK, TUR; etc.
Notes: Classification (2) is based on the comparison of hourly wages reported in industry ‘‘Total’’;
classifications (3) and (4) are based on the comparison of hourly wages reported for single industry.
i country, j industry, t time. Full set of LWC classification is included in the electronic supplementary
materials
19 We use dollar-denominated non-PPP adjusted per capita GDP data, from PWT 8.0.
Empirica
123
classification constant and basing it only on the final year would have been over-
simplistic). Similarly, classifications (2)–(4), based on a direct comparison of
wages, allow for changes in relative wage levels over time. Classification (2) defines
as low-wage those countries where the average wage (reported in industry ‘‘Total’’)
in year t was below 10 % of the US wage level20 in year t. This classification is
constant across industries but varies over time, as some countries might have
experienced a convergence of wages towards US levels. However, a decision to
outsource parts of production abroad is likely to be based on the evaluation of cross-
border labour cost differentials in specific industries, and not in the economy as a
whole, so classification (3) is even more detailed. This comparison of wages is
performed within every industry: a given country is defined as a LWC for industry
j and year t if the wage level in this industry is below the threshold set at 10 % of the
US wage in the same industry j and at time t. Finally, classification (4)—the most
detailed and our preferred one—uses the average sectoral wage in the whole sample
of countries as a benchmark (and not the US wage as before): a given country is
defined as a LWC for industry j and year t if the wage level in this industry is below
a threshold set at 30 % of the average wage21 paid globally in the same industry
j and at time t. The examples shown in Table 1 confirm two things: (i) classification
(1) is likely to be biased, and (ii) the cross-industry variability of wages, visible
when classifications (3) and (4) are employed, should be taken into account, as some
countries are revealed as ‘low-wage’ only for certain industries. This is clearly
visible in Table 11 (in the ‘‘Appendix’’): in 2009 countries such as Bulgaria and
China could be put in the LWC category for all manufacturing sectors, but this is not
true in the case of, for instance, countries such as Romania and Turkey.
3 Descriptive evidence
Our data confirm a substantial rise in offshoring in recent decades. The
manufacturing offshoring intensity in our sample of 40 countries—measured in
the broad sense as the ratio of imported intermediate inputs to the value added, as in
Eq. (1)—rose from 0.24 in 1995 to 0.3022 in 2008 (and then there was a drop in
2009 due to the global crisis). This is illustrated in Fig. 1. The common view,
nourishing fears of cross-border labour substitution and/or a downward pressure on
domestic wages, is that intermediates are sourced mainly from developing countries.
Is this really the case? In order to answer this question, we shall first show the
20 We have chosen not to adopt a 5 % threshold, as in Khandelwal (2010), because by doing so only three
countries (namely China, India and Indonesia) would have been classified as low-wage countries.
21 As a robustness check, we also adopt two other classifications: modifying the threshold set for our
benchmark classification (4) and setting it at 50 % of the average wage; and 100 % of the average wage
(hence, LWC are those countries which have sectoral wages below half of the average wage, or below the
average wage). Results available from authors upon request.
22 The weighted averages across 40 countries are listed in Table 10, weighted according to sector size
(total hours worked by persons engaged). The values refer to imports from these 40 countries (excluding
RoW—rest of the world, present in the WIOD data).
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evidence concerning the classic developing/developed countries division and then
move on to using a country grouping based on explicit wage information.
Table 2 reports the relative shares of different source countries (or country
groups) in the total value of intermediates imported by the 40 countries in our
sample (panel A) or only by developed countries (panel B) in the border years of
our analysis (1995 and 2009). In reality, the majority of intermediate goods
Fig. 1 Trends in manufacturing offshoring—overall and by source countries. Note Offshoring intensity
is measured in a broad sense as the ratio of imported intermediate inputs to the value added (Eq. 1).
Weighted averages across 13 manufacturing industries (Table 9 in the ‘‘Appendix’’). The weights
correspond to industry size (employment). a all 40 destination countries, b only developed countries
retained as destination countries (countries listed in Table 10 in the ‘‘Appendix’’). Source: own
elaboration with input–output data from WIOD
Table 2 Imported manufacturing intermediates split by country of origin, shares (in %). Source: own
elaboration with input–output data from WIOD
Countries of origin A. Sample of destination countries:
all countries (40)
B. Sample of destination countries:
developed countries (31)
1995 2009 1995 2009
Developing countries 8.7 19.1 9.1 19.2
China 2.5 10.4 2.6 10.6
India 0.8 1.3 0.8 1.3
Developed countries 91.3 80.9 90.9 80.8
G8 61.5 49.3 60.9 48.9
US 14.1 12.2 12.5 9.9
EU15 50.8 44.2 53.9 50.1
TOTAL (40) 100 100 100 100
Notes: The statistics present the shares (in %) of imported intermediates from specific regions/countries of
origin in the overall value of intermediate good imports from all 40 countries analysed (listed in Table 10
in the ‘‘Appendix’’). Division between developing and developed countries from the World Bank
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(approx. 81 % in 2009) are still imported from developed countries. However, a
change in the direction of offshoring is evident: the share of imports of
intermediates from developing countries more than doubled. In 2009, over 10 % of
all manufacturing intermediates came from China (four times more than in 1995).
India’s share is significantly lower, but despite its specialization in services
offshoring, this country managed to improve its position as a source market of
intermediate manufacturing goods. Considering developed countries as countries of
origin, the importance of the EU15 and G8 as source markets of intermediate
goods strongly decreased, whereas for the U.S. the fall was less pronounced but
still visible. The figures reported in panel A and panel B are fairly similar, with
only a few differences concerning a slightly greater relative importance of the
EU15 as sources of imports for developed countries than in the overall sample
(especially in 2009, when half of the inputs imported by developed countries came
from the EU15).
Figure 1 shows how the intensity of manufacturing offshoring to developing
countries evolved in time in comparison with overall offshoring intensity and
offshoring to developed countries. Here, the numbers refer to the share of the value
of imported inputs with respect to the industry value added (calculated as in Eq. 1).
Plot A shows the trends typical for all 40 destination countries in our sample, while
plot B refers to the restricted sample of destination countries: only developed
countries. When the sample is restricted (plot B), we note that the offshoring
intensity in this group is generally higher. In line with Table 2, it is notable that
offshoring to developed countries accounts for most overall offshoring (but a
decline, probably due to the global crisis, is clearly visible). However, offshoring to
developing countries was constantly growing (for all the 40 countries in our
sample—plot A—in 1995 on average it accounted for 2 % of manufacturing value
added, and already for 7 % in 2009; for developed countries—plot B—the values
are 3 % in 1995 and 8.5 % in 2009 respectively).
Given our interest in offshoring to low-wage markets, Fig. 2 shows the trends
concerning offshoring intensity calculated only with imports from LWC. Indepen-
dently of the LWC classification adopted (see Table 1), a constant rise in offshoring
to countries characterized by low wages is observed. The solid black line, referring
to our benchmark LWC classification (4) and based on a comparison of wages
within industries and with respect to the global level, indicates that the offshoring to
LWC directed to the 40 countries in our sample (plot A) rose from 2.5 % of value
added in 1995 to 7.5 % in 2009. Plot B shows that the offshoring from developed
countries to LWC rose from 2.8 % of the developed countries’ value added in 1995
to 8.5 % in 2009.
An important question thus emerges: is there any relationship between the rise
in offshoring to LWC and the wages paid in domestic industries sourcing parts of
their production processes to LWC? Typically, low- and medium-skilled workers
(whose tasks are easily outsourced) in developed countries are afraid of pressure
from foreign low-wage competitors. Figure 3 shows simple plots relating the log of
low-skilled workers’ wages paid in manufacturing industries in developed
countries to industry exposure to offshoring. Plot A, obtained with the overall
offshoring measure, shows that there is practically no relationship between the two
Empirica
123
variables. Here, offshoring is measured independently of the type of source country
of the imported inputs. However, when we account for offshoring to LWC only
(plot B), a negative relationship emerges. This evidence, so far unconditional on
any other factors possibly affecting wages, will be tested with the formal empirical
model.
Fig. 2 Trends in manufacturing offshoring to low-wage countries (LWC). Note Offshoring intensity
measured in a broad sense as the ratio of intermediate inputs imported from low-wage countries
(classifications in Table 1) to the value added. Weighted averages across 13 manufacturing industries
(Table 9 in the ‘‘Appendix’’). The weights correspond to industry size (employment). a all 40 destination
countries, b only developed countries retained as destination countries (countries listed in Table 10 in the
‘‘Appendix’’). Source: own elaboration with input–output data from WIOD
(A) (B)
Fig. 3 Relationship between offshoring intensity and low skilled wages in developed countries. Note
Offshoring measured in a broad sense as the ratio of imported intermediate inputs to the value added
(Eq. 1). Sample analysed: 13 manufacturing industries (Table 9 in the ‘‘Appendix’’), 31 developed
countries (Table 10 in the ‘‘Appendix’’), 1995–2009. a offshoring to all 40 countries, b: offshoring only
to LWC (according to classification 4). The lines correspond to LOWESS approximations (span = 0.8),






The description of mechanisms relating trade (including trade in parts and
components due to offshoring) and wages is present in several strands of
international economics literature.23 Importantly from the point of view of our
empirical analysis, the theories evolved in the direction of showing that wage effects
stemming from outsourcing/trade shocks can vary across skill classes of workers.
The first wave of research on trade and wages (e.g. Borjas et al. 1997) relied on
Hecksher-Ohlin (HO) framework which emphasizes differences in factor intensities
across sectors and factor endowments across countries. Less educated workers
(whose tasks are easier to be moved to foreign destinations) have been typically
perceived to be more at risk of experiencing a wage loss. As we will show in the
empirical analysis, this indeed is true (albeit the effect is small). Stolper-Samuelson
theorem was used to address the implications of trade (especially with less
developed countries) for the labour markets: trade-induced industry level shocks
result in changes in goods prices, which in turn change factor prices (wages). The
‘cone of diversification’ was assumed to be fixed, so the next class of models (e.g.
Feenstra and Hanson 1999; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, GRH 2008) allowed for
the change in the set of goods produced in the country. In particular, GRH
introduced the ‘task trade’ approach and focused on the adjustment of the bundle of
domestically provided intermediate inputs, resulting from the division of tasks into
those which are performed at home and those which are offshored. In terms of
guidelines for the empirical analysis, GRH show that there is no unique outcome of
trade/offshoring shock: e.g. the evolution of low skill wages will depend on the net
effects of offshoring on productivity, prices and labour supply.
In general, the attempts in the recent years have been focused on building models
which incorporate features of various theoretical frameworks, moving the theory as
close to the reality as possible. The Ricardian framework (focusing on productivity
differences across countries), has been modified by Rodrı´guez-Clare (2010) who
embodied the GRH approach in a Ricardian model a` la Eaton and Kortum (2002).
There have also been attempts to match HO and Ricardian explanations. Burstein
and Vogel (2011) present an interesting unifying framework which links traditional
mechanism featuring sectoral productivity and factor endowment differences with
the development of new–new trade theory. They incorporate firm heterogeneity into
the modelling of the link between globalization and factor prices. Wages are defined
by firm productivity: more productive firms use more intensively high skilled
labour, so free trade affects wages through Melitz-type mechanism of firm selection
and within-industry shifts of employment towards the most productive firms.
Finally, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2014) proposed an analytical model in which
both trade in goods and trade in tasks arise, so they matched HO and GRH
frameworks.
23 See Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2014) for a recent review of the related theoretical literature on the
effects of trade in intermediate goods.
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Our empirical specification is rooted in the Ricardian model of skills, tasks and
technologies presented by Acemoglu and Autor (2011).24 They explicitly distin-
guish between tasks and skills, with the former understood as units of work activity
that produce output, and the latter as workers’ endowments of capabilities for
performing various tasks. The model incorporates three types of labour: h—high-,
m—medium- and l—low-skilled, all of which can perform given tasks, with the
assumption that more complex tasks are performed by high-skilled workers, routine
tasks by middle-skilled and manual by low-skilled labour.25 Generally, tasks can be
performed by workers with different types of skills, automated using machines, or
offshored and performed by workers in other countries. This concept of offshoring
competing for tasks follows the model in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
To sum up, the wages of workers with different skills are defined simply as a
function of the labour supply (Ls) and task assignments (Is), with s = {h,m,l}. The
allocation of tasks is further determined by capital (K), which can also supply tasks
by substituting labour and through offshoring opportunities: Is = f(OFF). This
yields the skill-specific wage function: Ws = f(Ls, K, OFF), which is the basis of
our empirical setting.
4.2 Empirical specification
In order to empirically examine the link between offshoring and wages, we estimate
different variants of the following regression:
lnwsijt ¼ aþ b1lnkijt þ b2lnLsijt þ b3lnOFFijt1 þ Dit þ Dij þ Dt þ esijt
_ s ¼ h;m; lf g ð3Þ
where i denotes the country, j the industry, t is time and s is the skill category.
Variable k refers to the capital to labour ratio,26 L is the total number of hours
worked per person engaged and OFF is the measure of offshoring intensity defined
in (1). To take into account a possible time delay between offshoring and wage
adjustment, the offshoring intensity (OFF) is introduced as a lagged variable (the
24 We present here only the basic assumptions of this model. For the detail mathematical notation of the
model and the exact steps to obtain the wage equation, see Acemoglu and Autor (2011, 1096–1147).
25 In the recent literature dealing with labour market consequences of cross border production sharing,
medium skill workers (performing routine tasks), are often perceived to be at risk. This phenomenon is
linked to the polarisation of labour markets (Goos and Manning 2003) observed in the US (Autor and
Dorn 2013; Autor et al. 2015) and in European countries (Goos et al. 2014; Michaels et al. 2014). The
polarization is generally explained by ‘‘computerization of routine job tasks which may lead to the
simultaneous growth of high-education, high-paid jobs at one end and low-education, low-wage jobs at
the other end, both at the expense of middle-wage, middle-education jobs’’ (Autor 2015, 12).
Employment polarisation implies the shift of employment and earnings from mid-level wage jobs to both
high- and low-wage jobs while wage polarization refers to earnings growth at the tails of the distribution.
Goos et al. (2014) provide a theoretical framework in which they distinguish between different channels
driving polarisation: routine-biased technological change (RBTC) and offshoring.
26 In the absence of direct skill-specific productivity data, we assume that productivity is related to the
capital intensity of the industry (captured by variable k) and, following Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we
assume that workers’ productivity follows a positive time trend (time dummies, country-sector and
country-time effects are included in the model).
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same approach is used in Ebenstein et al. 2014). In order to pick up any other
unmeasurable specific effects (e.g. technological change, business cycle), we
include a set of year dummies, as well as country-time dummies and country-
industry fixed effects.27
In an augmented specification we also include the offshoring components





Finally, to allow for the possibility that offshoring to low-wage countries (LWC)
might have different effects to offshoring to high-wage countries (HWC), we
include intermediate imports from LWC and HWC as separate regressors, yielding
the following equation:
lnwsijt ¼ aþ b1lnkijt þ b2lnLsijt þ b3lnDomOUTijt1 þ b4lnIntOUT LWCijt1
þ b5lnIntOUT HWCijt1 þ Dit þ Dij þ Dt þ esijt
_ s ¼ h;m; lf g ð5Þ
5 Results
5.1 Overall effect of offshoring on wages—all source countries, full sample
of destination countries
In this section we present the results of the most general estimation of the empirical
models (Eqs. 3 and 4) taking into account the full sample of countries and
offshoring independently of the source country of imports. We start with a fixed
effects estimator (which allows for time-invariant country-industry specific effects).
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the wage regression model for low-
(Columns 1 and 2), medium- (Columns 3 and 4) and high-skilled workers (Columns
5 and 6). As predicted by theory, for all the skill categories we obtain statistically
significant and positive parameters associated with the capital-labour ratio (k) and
negative parameters in the case of skill-specific labour supplies (L). Offshoring
intensity is, however, our main variable of interest. OFF (calculated as in Eq. 1),
appears to have a significant negative impact on the wages of low-, medium- and
high-skilled workers employed in domestic manufacturing sectors. However, as
reported in columns 2, 4 and 6, when OFF is decomposed into pure international
and domestic parts, in the empirical model (4), then the negative and statistically
27 Due to the data constraints we were not able to include into our model the division of capital stock into
ICT and a non-ICT elements with the ICT component capturing directly the effects of SBTC (as it was
done e.g. by Michaels et al. 2014). Following, Foster-McGregor et al. (2013) we control for SBTC
indirectly through the inclusion of a set of dummies and fixed effects.
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significant effect of IntOUT on wages is only sustained in the case of low-skilled
labour. Additionally, domestic outsourcing (DomOUT) does not affect the wages of
any skill category in a statistically significant way.
However, we are aware of potential endogeneity issues in the models estimated.
First, regarding labour (L) as the explanatory variable, industry-level wages and
employment by skill level may be determined simultaneously. Second, there can be
a two-way relationship between offshoring and wages e.g. the level of wages where
the production is offshored is crucial. On the basis of endogeneity tests (Table 12 in
the ‘‘Appendix’’) we cannot reject the hypothesis that L and DomOUT can be treated
as exogenous, while exogeneity of the offshoring variables (OFF, IntOUT) is
strongly rejected.
To address this issue, we adopt a gravity-based strategy (extending Frankel and
Romer’s 1999 traditional approach to sectoral-level data as in Di Giovanni and
Levchenko 2009) to construct an instrument for our offshoring indices. Using the
data on bilateral imports in the panel analysed (40 countries, 13 manufacturing
industries, 1995–2009), we estimate a gravity model in which bilateral trade in
intermediate goods is regressed on the log of the reporter’s and the partner’s value
added, the log of the distance between the countries, and dummy variables for a
common land border, common official language, common currency, former colonial
relationship and membership in a common regional trade agreement. For each of the
industries and reporter countries, the predicted values of trade flows are then
Table 3 The impact of global offshoring on wages (lnwsijt)—FE estimation. Source: own calculations
with data from WIOD
Sample: all destination countries (40)
Low-skill wage Medium-skill wage High-skill wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnkijt 0.398*** 0.398*** 0.312*** 0.311*** 0.315*** 0.315***
[0.044] [0.044] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.037]
lnLsijt -0.074** -0.077** -0.176*** -0.179*** -0.191*** -0.194***
[0.035] [0.034] [0.032] [0.032] [0.034] [0.033]
lnOFFijt-1 -0.087*** -0.079*** -0.062***
[0.023] [0.022] [0.024]
lnDomOUTijt-1 -0.034 -0.013 0.02
[0.032] [0.031] [0.030]
lnIntOUTijt-1 -0.047* -0.037 -0.013
[0.024] [0.024] [0.025]
R2 0.404 0.398 0.395 0.389 0.331 0.328
Observations 7209 7209 7221 7221 7205 7205
Notes: Constant included—not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-
industry level. Statistically significant at ***1, ** 5, * 10 percent level. In all specifications, year
dummies, country-industry and country-year fixed effects are included. Estimates obtained with the broad




summed across all the partner countries or, alternatively, across selected partners to
obtain an instrument for intermediate goods trade with the groups considered in our
analysis (e.g. LWC).28
The IV results, corresponding to the Table 3 FE estimations, are reported in
Table 4. The instrument validity is confirmed by under-identification and weak
identification tests. In this specification, only offshoring (OFF), measured globally,
has a significant and negative impact on the wages of low- and medium-skilled
workers, with low estimated elasticity (approx. -0.1).
The results in Table 3 and Table 4 should be treated as a first step in the deeper
examination of the offshoring-wage nexus. In the first instance, we shall take into
account the characteristics of the countries from which inputs are imported.
From now on, we will concentrate on the results obtained with the use of IV
estimates employing the gravity-based instrument.
5.2 Exploring the heterogeneity of source countries: the wage effect
of offshoring to low-wage countries
Tables 5 and 6 report the results referring to the effects of offshoring when we
distinguish between intermediate imports from low-wage (LWC) and high-wage
countries (HWC). In order to assure the maximum level of detail and to allow for
structural change effects and domestic outsourcing, we report the results obtained
once the decomposition (Eq. 2) of the general OFF measure is taken into account
using empirical specification (5). We focus on the wages of workers who are
potentially most at danger: the low- (Table 5) and medium-skilled (Table 6).29
The subsequent columns in Table 5 show the results of the regression estimations
employing alternative classifications of LWC (summarized in Table 1—classifica-
tion 4 is our preferred one) for the low-skilled workers. Whichever alternative
classification of LWC we use, we find a negative effect of offshoring to LWC on the
wages of low-skilled labour. The estimated elasticities are, however, very small (in
the absolute terms below 0.1). For instance, sticking with classification (4) of LWC
and when we account for domestic structural change (results in column 4 of
Table 5), a rise in offshoring to LWC of 1 % is associated with a decrease in the
wages paid to domestic low-skilled workers of only 0.085 %. There is no significant
impact of offshoring to HWC. Additionally, a negative effect of domestic
fragmentation on wages emerges (a negative parameter associated with DomOUT).
28 The data on bilateral trade in intermediate goods come from WIOT (release: November 2013), the data
on value added from the WIOD Socio Economic Accounts, SEA (update: July 2014) and the information
on all the other regressors are taken from CEPII databases. The Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
method—PPML (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006) is employed to estimate the gravity equation
separately for each of the sectors. Thanks to this we do not lose information about zero trade flows. A
similar approach is employed, e.g., by Parteka and Wolszczak-Derlacz (2015).
29 The corresponding results concerning high-skilled workers are presented in Table 13 in the
‘‘Appendix’’. In general, have intermediate imports purchases neither from LWC nor from HWC a
statistically significant impact on the wages of domestic high-skilled workers. Only when classification 1

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Table 6 we present the analogous results for medium-skilled labour. In
general, the results for medium-skilled workers and similar to those for the low
skilled. However, the magnitude of the parameter is slightly lower e.g. for
classification (4) for medium-skilled workers it is equal to -0.068 (column 4 of
Table 6).30
5.3 Exploring the heterogeneity of destination countries: the effect
of offshoring on wages in developed countries
The big advantage of our dataset is its wide country coverage (40 countries). We
have already shown the importance of distinguishing the country of origin of
intermediate imports but we have not yet explored the heterogeneity on the left-
Table 5 The impact of offshoring on wages of low-skilled workers (lnwsijt)—IV estimation, source
countries split into low-wage and high-wage countries (LWC and HWC). Source: own calculations with
data from WIOD
Sample: all destination countries (40)
LWC class.1 LWC class.2 LWC class.3 LWC class.4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnkijt 0.356*** 0.363*** 0.366*** 0.381***
[0.040] [0.041] [0.042] [0.042]
lnLsijt -0.112*** -0.101*** -0.098*** -0.083**
[0.032] [0.032] [0.033] [0.033]
lnDomOUTijt-1 -0.070** -0.073** -0.063* -0.061*
[0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032]
lnIntOUT_LWCijt-1 -0.077*** -0.075*** -0.077*** -0.085***
[0.011] [0.014] [0.015] [0.018]
lnIntOUT_HWCijt-1 -0.025 -0.038 -0.008 -0.004
[0.032] [0.032] [0.035] [0.034]
Observations 6692 6692 6692 6692
Under-identification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identification 150.1 163.8 168.2 137.6
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country-industry level. Statistically sig-
nificant at ***1, ** 5, * 10 percent level. In all specifications, year dummies, country-industry and
country-year fixed effects included. Estimates obtained with the broad offshoring measure. International
outsourcing (lnIntOUT_LWCijt and lnIntOUT_HWCijt) treated as endogenous variables and instrumented
on the basis of the gravity equation, as explained in the main text. The figures reported for the under-
identification test are the p values and refer to the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test statistic, where a rejection
of the null indicates that the instruments are not under-identified. The weak identification test refers to the
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic test for the presence of weak instruments. As a ‘‘rule of thumb’’ the
statistic should be at least 10 for weak identification not to be considered a problem (Staiger and Stock,
1997)
30 As described in the introduction, papers employing industry level data and showing negative
consequences on medium skilled workers deal primarily with the effects of outsourcing on employment
or labour demand structure (Foster-McGregor et al. 2013; Timmer et al. 2013). In our paper, we focus on
the effect on wages, so the results shown in the two strands of literature are not directly comparable.
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hand side of the estimated equations (Eqs. 3–5). Given that approximately three-
quarters of imported manufacturing intermediates are directed to developed
countries,31 and following worries of workers in these countries concerning foreign
competition, we will explicitly deal with the effects of offshoring on wages in
developed economies.32
Table 7 presents the results obtained for the restricted sample of destination
countries (excluding developing countries), corresponding to the estimates
concerning all 40 countries reported in Table 4. Overall offshoring (OFF, imports
from all countries—independently of type) turn out to exhibit a downward pressure
on the wages of low- and medium-skilled workers employed in developed countries
(results in columns 1 and 3). This negative impact of foreign sourcing is also
sustained when OFF is decomposed (a negative and statistically significant
parameter for IntOUT is reported in columns 2 and 4). Again the magnitude of the
parameters are relatively low, with elasticises both for low and medium-skilled
workers lower than |0.1|. There is no effect on high skilled workers in developed
countries.
Table 6 The impact of offshoring on wages of medium-skilled workers (lnwsijt)—IV estimation, source
countries split into low-wage and high-wage countries (LWC and HWC). Source: own calculations with
data from WIOD
Sample: all destination countries (40)
LWC class.1 LWC class.2 LWC class.3 LWC class.4
(2) (3) (4) (5)
lnkijt 0.292*** 0.298*** 0.299*** 0.307***
[0.037] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038]
lnLsijt -0.183*** -0.176*** -0.175*** -0.166***
[0.031] [0.032] [0.032] [0.031]
lnDomOUTijt-1 -0.051* -0.054* -0.040 -0.041
[0.030] [0.030] [0.031] [0.031]
lnIntOUT_LWCijt-1 -0.055*** -0.044*** -0.049*** -0.068***
[0.010] [0.011] [0.013] [0.016]
lnIntOUT_HWCijt-1 -0.044 -0.060 -0.028 -0.016
[0.029] [0.059] [0.032] [0.031]
Observations 6702 6702 6702 6702
Under-identification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identification 156 165 173 145
Notes: As below Table 5
31 The share of developed countries (as destination countries) in the overall imported inputs from all 40
source countries is 77 % in 2009 (for comparison, 88 % in 1995). Taking into account only imports from
developing countries, in 2009 77 % were also sent to developed countries (92 % in 1995). Own
calculations, based on data from WIOD, industries and countries listed in Tables 9 and 10 respectively.
32 We also run all the estimates for the subsample of developing countries. However, in none of the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The next step is to explicitly assess the role of offshoring to LWC on the wages
of low-skilled workers employed in developed countries. As Table 8 shows, after
separating the role of domestic sourcing, the parameter associated with international
offshoring to LWC (IntOUT_LWC) turns out to be negative and statistically
significant, but small. Alternative LWC classifications do not significantly alter this
result.
5.4 Alternative specifications and robustness checks
In this study, we are primarily interested in the effect of offshoring on domestic
wages. Hence, our baseline specification (3) assumes that the main channel of the
offshoring impact on the labour market is through wage adjustment. In the model
we observe this outcome (wages) only for the employed. However, we are aware
that there are other channels to be considered. First of all, and especially if wages
are rigid, the adjustment of domestic labour markets to the movement of some parts
of production abroad can materialize through a drop in employment.33 Autor et al.
Table 8 The impact of offshoring on wages of low-skilled workers (lnwsijt) in developed countries—IV
estimation, source countries split into low-wage and high-wage countries (LWC and HWC). Source: own
calculations with data from WIOD
Sample of destination countries: developed countries
LWC class.1 LWC class.2 LWC class.3 LWC class.4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnkijt 0.284*** 0.296*** 0.301*** 0.323***
[0.041] [0.043] [0.044] [0.047]
lnLsijt -0.081** -0.062* -0.058* -0.037
[0.033] [0.034] [0.035] [0.036]
lnDomOUTijt-1 -0.072* -0.077** -0.074** -0.073*
[0.037] [0.037] [0.038] [0.038]
lnIntOUT_LWCijt-1 -0.103*** -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.095***
[0.012] [0.014] [0.016] [0.019]
lnIntOUT_HWCijt-1 -0.055 -0.064 -0.045 -0.048
[0.034] [0.054] [0.039] [0.038]
Observations 5177 5177 5177 5177
Under-identification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identification 118 123 148 106
Notes: As below Table 5
33 This issue is also linked to the time of labour markets’ response to offshoring. Short term wage effects
arise when workers are immobile across countries and industries; while in the long run worker and firm
mobility is more probable, so the adjustment can also pass through employment. Theoretical mechanisms
of short and long run effects of increased fragmentation and offshoring on wages can be found in
Rodrı´guez-Clare’s (2010) Ricardian model. Their short-run analysis shows that when fragmentation is
sufficiently high, further increases in fragmentation lead to a deterioration (improvement) in the real wage
in the rich (poor) country. In the long-run these effects may be reversed as countries adjust their research
efforts in response to increased offshoring.
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(2013) argue that in such cases estimates of wage adjustment can be biased.
Additionally, offshoring can impact domestic wages indirectly—through produc-
tivity changes (this argument is present in theoretical models of trade in tasks, such
as Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008), e.g. an increase in productivity due to
global production sharing should raise wage levels. If offshoring really lowers
employment and/or raises productivity, then the inclusion of labour and capital34
controls in the estimated wage regression eliminates important channels through
which offshoring impacts wages. In the first robustness check we thus compare our
baseline specification (in which we hold employment and capital fixed) with the
model allowing employment and capital intensity to change in response to
offshoring.35 The results are presented in Tables 14 and 15 (columns 1 and 2) in
‘‘Appendix’’. The modified model yields a very similar response of low and
medium-skilled workers’ wages to offshoring to LWC to that obtained when
employment and capital are both controlled for.36
Our second robustness check is motivated by the fact that wage rigidity varies
substantially across countries, due to the diversity of labour market institutions. So
far, domestic labour market conditions and regulations have not been explicitly
taken into account, as the set of dummies and fixed effects should have picked up
the effects specific to single countries and industries. Nevertheless, we augment the
baseline regression with some additional country-specific covariates, such as the
unemployment rate37 and the degree of wage-setting coordination.38 After
controlling for diversity in labour market conditions in this way, the results
(reported in Tables 15—columns 3 and 4 and in Table 16 in ‘‘Appendix’’) do not
change dramatically: the negative effect of offshoring on domestic wages
materializes through imports from LWC and concerns mainly low- and medium-
skilled workers. As expected, unemployment negatively affects the wages of all the
skills groups and the wage bargaining setting is important for the determination of
wages. Assuming that centralized wage-bargaining systems are less flexible than
decentralized ones, in countries with rigid wages offshoring should have stronger
34 We do not include an additional productivity measure, e.g. value added per hour worked, since its
correlation with the capital-labour ratio is very high (the coefficient of correlation equals 0.87).
35 Hummels et al. (2014) propose a similar approach to distinguish between the direct and indirect effects
of offshoring on wages. In their study, they possess data at the firm level and compare the estimates with
and without firm controls.
36 We further check whether this result does not stem from the fact that the ‘productivity effect’ and the
‘labour substitution effect’ exhibit opposite impacts on wages and thus offset each other. However, this is
not confirmed by a comparison of the point estimates from two regressions: one controlling only for
employment (allowing for capital changes) and a second controlling only for capital (allowing for
employment changes). Taking into account the results obtained with the baseline LWC classification 4,
the point estimates of offshoring to LWC on low-skilled wages in these two models are equal to -0.098
and -0.085, respectively.
37 Data from the World Bank.
38 The information comes from the database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage
Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960–2011 (ICTWSS), constructed by Jelle Visser (version
4.0, April 2013). There is no data for MEX, RUS, TUR and TWN. Coordination of wage-setting is
expressed as a number ranging between 1 (fragmented wage bargaining, confined largely to individual
firms or plants) to 5 (centralized wage bargaining).
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effects on employment than on wages.39 Indeed, the magnitude of the estimated
elasticity between wages and IntOUT and IntOUT_LWC is here lower (-0.054 for
low-skilled and -0.036 for medium-skilled) than in the results reported in the main
text (Tables 5 and 6).
A third robustness check considers sector heterogeneity.40 Our panel consists of
13 manufacturing sectors which differ in offshoring intensity and can differ in their
reaction to its changes. The country-sector and sector-year individual effects
incorporated in our baseline specification (Eq. 3) should have controlled for this.
However, we do some additional robustness checks. In order to check whether the
results are driven by any specific industry (note that manufacturing coke and petrol
products has already been eliminated from the sample), we repeat all the estimates,
eliminating each of our 13 sectors one by one and running the regression for the
remaining 12. The results are very similar to the baseline ones. In particular, the
point estimates obtained for the IntOUT_LWC variable (analogous to those in
Table 5) are between -0.079 (when industry ‘‘Manufacturing not elsewhere
classified; Recycling’’ is eliminated) to -0.097 (when ‘‘Electrical And Optical
Equipment’’ is not taken into account). This exercise also addresses the problem of
interpreting machinery intermediate imports as an offshoring practice, which is
raised by some authors,41 since our results are robust to the exclusion of machinery
imports from the sample (point estimate -0.083).
Next, in order to check the relationship between offshoring and the technological
content of the activities of an industry (for example, Hertveldt and Michel 2013
argue that offshoring is less common for high-tech industries as it requires more
sophisticated inputs), we test for differences between high-tech and low-tech
industries.42 We introduce into the model an interaction term between offshoring
and a high-tech industry dummy (or a term for interaction between offshoring to
LWC/HWC and the high-tech dummy). Following Wooldridge (2010), we
instrument this using an interaction between high-tech and our instruments for
offshoring. Table 17 presents the results. Indeed, the wage drop due to offshoring is
stronger for low-tech industries; for high-tech industries a positive and statistically
significant coefficient on the interaction term suggests that the effect of offshoring
on wages is weaker.
The final robustness check considers the possible interdependence of wages of
different skill categories of workers. To take this issue into account, we estimated
the model through three-stage least squares (3SLS) in which we combine the system
estimation of SUR with the instrumental variables method of 2SLS (Zellner and
Theil 1962). The results of this exercise are very similar to our baseline specification
39 As noted by Geishecker et al. (2010), the problem can be more complex. For example, it is possible
that in countries with rigid wages (with a centralized wage bargaining system) which are at the same time
characterized by low flexibility of employment (e.g. due to a high level of employment protection)
offshoring impacts the labour market through wage adjustment rather than employment corrections.
40 The detailed results are available upon request.
41 For example, Hummels et al. (2014) argue that machinery imports may affect wages through access to
foreign technology rather than through offshoring per se.
42 Our division between high- and low-tech manufacturing industries follows Foster-McGregor et al.
(2013) and is reported in Table 9 in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
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as far as the significance of the parameters and their magnitude are considered (see
Table 18 in ‘‘Appendix’’).
6 Conclusions
This paper extends the literature on the implications of offshoring for labour
markets by investigating its effect on the wages of different skill groups in a broad
global context. Outsourcing can be viewed as a specific facet of deepening trade
integration, in particular the recent wave of globalisation and the so-called second
unbundling (expression coined by Baldwin). The aim of our study is to test
ambiguous effects of offshoring on wages in the presence of task relocation. Our
analysis draws on input–output data from the WIOD project and in the panel
analysed (13 manufacturing industries, 40 countries, 1995–2009) we have captured
up to 96 % of international trade in manufacturing inputs. Being particularly
interested in the wage effects of offshoring to developing and low-wage countries
(LWC), we employ novel, precise LWC classifications (varying across industries
and time) to decompose global offshoring by source country.
Some shortcomings of this study need to be admitted, mainly regarding the
specification of our offshoring measure, which is expressed as imported interme-
diate inputs. First, in order to guarantee that we consider the process of production
fragmentation rather than purchasing natural resources we excluded raw materials
from our industry sample. Second, the increased use of inputs (together with
imported inputs) can be simply the consequence of production growth. We
minimalized this problem by taking into account the size of the industry through an
employment variable and a set of dummies, especially country-industry and
industry-time. Third, it may be that offshoring is the result of domestic structural
changes e.g. through substituting foreign inputs for inputs previously purchased
from another domestic supplier. Since we are explicitly interested in the case when
foreign inputs substitute inputs previously produced within the firm, we performed
the decomposition ruling out domestic outsourcing. However, it should be noted
that a limitation of our study (and other papers which use input–output tables to
compute offshoring indices) is that we are unable to account for offshoring of final
production stages or of products which are not re-imported but exported to third
markets (Hijzen et al. 2005).
We find that the negative effect of offshoring on the domestic wages of low- and
medium- skilled workers is connected with imports from low-wage countries, but in
terms of magnitude this effect is rather small. The negative effect is not found for
high-skilled workers. These results are confirmed in a number of robustness checks.
Our findings that domestic wages do not dramatically decrease due to offshoring
is in line with the results of some other industry-level studies, such as Edwards and
Lawrence (2010), Ebenstein et al. (2014), or Parteka and Wolszczak-Derlacz
(2015). A possible explanation is that the downward pressure from offshoring is
cancelled by increased productivity, which may raise wages. Autor et al. (2013)
oppose the lack of significant effects of import exposure on manufacturing wages to
the impact felt outside manufacturing sectors. Alternatively, Ebenstein et al. (2014)
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conclude that wage adjustment materializes not at the level of industries but at the
level of occupations. However, due to the industry nature of our data we have not
been able to address this issue. There is a trade-off between our extensive data
coverage (40 countries, 13 manufacturing sectors) and the detail of micro-level
information usually available for a limited number of countries. The link between
offshoring and wages is of great importance for policy recommendations and hence
needs to be analysed comprehensively both from macro- and micro-level
perspectives.
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Appendix
See Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18.
Table 9 List of manufacturing industries
Industry code Description Industry type
15t16 Food, Beverages and Tobacco Low-tech
17t18 Textiles and Textile Products Low-tech
19 Leather, Leather and Footwear Low-tech
20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork Low-tech
21t22 Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing Medium-tech
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products High tech
25 Rubber And Plastics Medium tech
26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products Low tech
27t28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Low tech
29 Machinery not elsewhere classified High tech
30t33 Electrical and Optical Equipment High tech
34t35 Transport Equipment High tech
36t37 Manufacturing not elsewhere classified; Recycling Medium tech




Table 10 List of countries and division between developed and developing countries
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Table 11 Countries classified as low-wage according to classification 4 (2009)
Industry code 15t16 17t18 19 20 21t22 24 25 26 27t28 29 30t33 34t35 36t37
AUS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AUT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BEL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BGR X X X X X X X X X X X X X
BRA X X X X X 0 X X X 0 0 0 X
CAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CHN X X X X X X X X X X X X X
CYP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CZE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DEU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DNK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ESP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EST 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FIN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FRA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GBR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HUN X X 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
IDN X X X X X 0 X X X 0 0 0 X
IND X X X X X X X X X X X X X
IRL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ITA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
JPN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
KOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LTU 0 X X X 0 X X X X 0 0 X 0
LUX 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LVA X X X X 0 X 0 0 0 X X X X
MEX X X X X X X X X X X X X X
MLT 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NLD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
POL 0 X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X
PRT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ROU 0 X X X X 0 X 0 X X X X X
RUS X X X X X X X X X X X X X
SVK X X X X 0 X 0 0 0 X X X 0
SVN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SWE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




Industry code 15t16 17t18 19 20 21t22 24 25 26 27t28 29 30t33 34t35 36t37
TWN 0 0 X X X 0 0 X 0 0 X X X
USA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: X means the given country is classified as LWC (according to classification 4 based on comparison
of wages paid within industries, threshold: 30 %). Industries in separate columns. Complete classification
tables (for all countries, sectors and years) is available as additional supplementary material (online)
Table 12 Endogeneity tests
lnLijt lnOFFijt lnDomOUTijt lnIntOUTijt
Test stat [v2 (1)] 1.132 7.968 0.010 5.312
p value 0.287 0.005 0.9191 0.0212
Notes: GMM distance test based on 1-year lag of: lnLijt, lnDomOUTijt and gravity instrument of: lnOFFijt
and lnIntOUTijt. H0: the regressor can be treated as exogenous; computed with xtivreg2 in STATA.
Results of the tests when the regressors are offshoring indices to specific regions: LWC and HWC are
available upon request
Table 13 The impact of offshoring on wages of high-skilled workers (lnwsijt)—IV estimation, source
countries split into low-wage and high-wage countries (LWC and HWC). Source: own calculations with
data from WIOD
Sample: all destination countries (40)
LWC class.1 LWC class.2 LWC class.3 LWC class.4
(2) (3) (4) (5)
lnkijt 0.303*** 0.311*** 0.311*** 0.313***
[0.037] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038]
lnLsijt -0.197*** -0.188*** -0.189*** -0.188***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032]
lnDomOUTijt-1 -0.023 -0.028 -0.016 -0.013
[0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033]
lnIntOUT_LWCijt-1 -0.034*** -0.017 -0.014 -0.026
[0.011] [0.012] [0.014] [0.017]
lnIntOUT_HWCijt-1 -0.041 -0.065 -0.044 -0.032
[0.031] [0.051] [0.034] [0.032]
Observations 6687 6687 6687 6687
Under-identification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identification 147 162 165 133
Notes: As below Table 5
Empirica
123
Table 14 Robustness check: the impact of global offshoring on wages (lnwsijt)—IV estimation, speci-
fication without labour or capital controls. Source: own calculations with data from WIOD
Sample: all destination countries (40)
Low-skill wage Medium-skill wage High-skill wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnOFFijt-1 -0.112*** -0.104*** -0.064
[0.034] [0.032] [0.056]
lnDomOUTijt-1 -0.046 -0.041 -0.005
[0.038] [0.036] [0.038]
lnIntOUTijt-1 -0.051 -0.04 0.001
[0.036] [0.036] [0.039]
Observations 6693 6693 6703 6703 6688 6688
Under-identification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identification 774.3 724.5 778 721.3 771 690.2
Notes: As below Table 4
Table 15 Robustness check: the impact of offshoring on wages of low and medium-skilled workers.
Specification without labour and capital controls (columns 1 and 2); specification with additional vari-
ables (columns 3 and 4). Source: own calculations with data from WIOD, UN from World Bank, and
Coord from ICTWSS
Specification without labour and capital
controls
Specification with additional control
variables
Low-skilled wage Medium-skilled wage Low-skilled wage Medium-skilled
wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnDomOUTijt-1 -0.089** -0.075** -0.012*** -0.061*
[0.039] [0.037] [0.002] [0.031]
lnIntOUT_LWCijt-1 -0.107*** -0.084*** -0.054*** -0.036**
[0.021] [0.020] [0.018] [0.016]
lnIntOUT_HWCijt-1 -0.008 -0.018 -0.013 -0.036











Table 16 Robustness check: the impact of global offshoring on wages (lnwsijt)—additional variables:
unemployment rate (UN), degree of wage-setting coordination (Coord). Source: Own calculations with
data from WIOD, UN from World Bank, and Coord from ICTWSS
Sample: all countries (40)
Low-skill wage Medium-skill wage High-skill wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnkijt 0.407*** 0.407*** 0.329*** 0.330*** 0.304*** 0.304***
[0.047] [0.048] [0.043] [0.043] [0.041] [0.041]
lnLsijt -0.056 -0.056 -0.115*** -0.114*** -0.182*** -0.183***
[0.036] [0.035] [0.037] [0.036] [0.032] [0.031]
UNit -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.006*** -0.006***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Coordit 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.009** 0.009** 0.010* 0.010*
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
lnOFFijt-1 -0.083** -0.066* -0.021
[0.036] [0.034] [0.036]
lnDomOUTijt-1 -0.044 -0.042 0.006
[0.040] [0.038] [0.040]
lnIntOUTijt-1 -0.054* -0.04 0.009
[0.029] [0.027] [0.028]
Observations 5692 5692 5702 5702 5690 5690
Under-identification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identification 568.4 532 575.8 551 567.9 523
Notes: As below Table 4. IV estimation, source countries split into low-wage and high-wage countries
(LWC and HWC)
Table 15 continued
Specification without labour and capital
controls
Specification with additional control
variables
Low-skilled wage Medium-skilled wage Low-skilled wage Medium-skilled
wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observations 6693 6703 5692 5702
Under-identification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identification 139 144 118 128
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 : notes as below Table 4, specification without labour and capital controls.
Columns 3 and 4—notes as below Table 5, countries split into low-wage (LWC) and high-wage (HWC)




Table 17 Robustness check: sector heterogeneity (high-tech versus low-tech industries). Source: Own
calculations with data from WIOD
Low-skilled wage Medium-skilled wage High-skilled wage
(1) (2) (3)
lnkijt 0.370*** 0.292*** 0.302***
[0.042] [0.037] [0.037]
lnLsijt -0.094*** -0.182*** -0.198***
[0.034] [0.032] [0.032]
lnDomOUTijt-1 -0.074** -0.059* -0.029
[0.033] [0.031] [0.034]
lnIntOUT_LWCijt-1 -0.132*** -0.124*** -0.074***
[0.025] [0.023] [0.024]
HT 9 lnIntOUT_LWCijt-1 0.094*** 0.109*** 0.082**
[0.034] [0.032] [0.033]
lnIntOUT_HWCijt-1 0.013 0.007 -0.001
[0.046] [0.042] [0.044]
HT 9 lnIntOUT_HWCijt-1 -0.036 -0.073 -0.096
[0.087] [0.084] [0.090]
Observations 6692 6702 6687
Under-identification 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identification 17 17 17
Notes: As below Table 5. IV estimation, model includes an additional interaction term between high-tech
industry dummy, HT, and offshoring. Classification (4) of LWC, division of industries into high tech and
low tech as in Table 9
Table 18 Robustness check: three-stage least squares SUR regression. Source: own calculations with
data from WIOD
Sample: all countries (40)
Low-skill wage Medium-skill wage Low-skill wage Medium-skill wage
lnkijt 0.414*** 0.353*** 0.403*** 0.345***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009]
lnLijt -0.052*** -0.093*** -0.054*** -0.095***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
lnDomOUTijt-1 -0.040*** -0.023* -0.062*** -0.046***
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